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The unemployment rate in Chile averaged slightly over 6.5 per-
cent throughout a ten-year period of high economic growth that ended
in 1997. Unemployment then rose significantly at the outset of the
Asian crisis, reaching levels near 11 percent. This broadly coincided
with the implementation of a set of legal initiatives that increased
protection standards in labor regulation. After the end of the military
government in 1990, labor codes began to revert to their previous
trend of high levels of regulation, with reforms approved in congress
in 1990, 1993 and 2001. These introduced higher costs of dismissal,
sanctions against firms that fire without just cause, extended provi-
sions for and broader coverage of union bargaining, and a significant
increase in the minimum wage (which was implemented in three
stages beginning in 1998). These regulations are closer to the Euro-
pean-style labor market protection than to the Anglo-American tradi-
tion, which relies more on market forces. A quick look at the relative
performance of unemployment rates under these two approaches can
help clarify the controversy generated among economists and
policymakers during this period.
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One side of the argument holds that the recent trend in unemploy-
ment is basically cyclical in nature, responding to the GDP slowdown
triggered by the Asian crisis and reinforced by the quick succession of
negative external shocks that included a large fall in the terms of trade,
September 11, and turbulence in Argentina and Brazil. The persistent
behavior of unemployment is thus merely a reflection of persistent
shocks and not the result of an intrinsically rigid labor market limited
by the current legal framework. This framework, the argument con-
tinues, is still far from European standards, especially when de jure
regulations are placed in the context of their de facto repercussions in
a country with weak legal enforcement. The difference between de
jure and de facto regulation is considered in Rama and Artecona (2002)
and Calderón and Chong (in this volume).
The other side argues that the recent rise and persistence of un-
employment is mainly explained by the growing trend in labor regu-
lations since the early 1990s, which have increased rigidity in the
labor market. This has been particularly important since the last
reform implemented in 2001, which has, according to this view, sig-
nificantly discouraged employment creation and caused factor substi-
tution toward capital utilization.1
Although the first line of argumentation sustains that significant
increases in regulation can coexist with low levels of unemployment
conditional on the cyclical position (as they did before 1998), some
selected facts make a strong case for the second view. First, it is hard
to reconcile the cyclical hypothesis with the evidence of some South-
east Asian economies, which managed to recover rather quickly from
the crisis despite being severely affected. Second, an argument that
draws on factor substitution trends raise the alert on repeating the
European experience of growth with unemployment. Indeed, the re-
cent evolution of relative factor costs suggests that the trend in regu-
lation may indeed have strengthened union bargaining power. Despite
sharp levels of unemployment, the path of real earnings remained
almost unaltered, showing a steady increase throughout the 1990s,
while the cost of capital decreased over the period.2 Something simi-
lar happens with minimum wages: the ratio of the minimum wage to
average wages was stable in the mid-1990s and then increased sharply
1. Bergoeing and Morandé (2003) argue that the discussion of the reform
itself generated an anticipated fall of labor demand.
2. An alternative explanation could be posed based on the efficiency wages
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after 1999, whereas the share of young workers in total employment
declined steadily across the same period. This combination of events
supports the view that the minimum wage is way above equilibrium,
which is formally sustained by recent evidence in Cowan and others
(2003).
Finally, the concern with the level and persistence of unemploy-
ment seems particularly well-founded when two additional aspects
are considered. First, two opposite forces usually affect the labor sup-
ply in the face of rising unemployment: the discouraging effect on job
search among workers with worsened employment chances and the
marginal worker effect, in which additional family members must
join the labor force to augment domestic earnings. The Chilean expe-
rience clearly points to a dominant role for the former, as demon-
strated by the decrease in labor-force participation and by empirical
estimations of the procyclicality of the labor supply (García, 1995).
Second, a growing portion of the recent job creation figures corre-
sponds to self-employment in the informal sector, which increased
markedly in the late 1990s in response to the Asian crisis. These jobs
are typically low in productivity and socially unprotected. The joint
effect of the drop in labor participation and the rise in informal jobs
implies that reported unemployment figures actually underestimate
the extent of the problem.
However suggestive, the above analysis does not assess the de-
gree of rigidity present in the Chilean labor market, as it fails to
identify whether observed unemployment reflects a current shock or
persistence stemming from lack of market flexibility. In this context,
our goal is to measure the relative flexibility of the labor market by
using a performance-based indicator that can account for this distinc-
tion, in order to rank Chile within a group of countries that includes
both members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (OECD) and emerging economies.
Our indicator is defined as the half-life of unemployment after
the economy is hit by a shock, which is compatible with the cyclical
rigidity we examine in this paper. When unemployment quickly con-
verges to its natural rate after a shock, the country’s labor market is
ranked as being highly flexible, no matter what that natural rate of
unemployment might be. We do not address the kind of rigidity that
would explain differences in the natural rate of unemployment among
countries, although the two issues might be related.
The model that guides our empirical approach is very much in
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Lopez-Salido (2000), who associate labor market rigidity with the per-
sistence of unemployment in the presence of macroeconomic shocks.3
Indeed, their international evidence reveals a clear relation between
institutional measures of rigidity and the macroeconomic dynamics.
Since our main goal is to rank Chile in terms of labor market rigid-
ity, we naturally consider a model for an emerging open economy
that is frequently affected by large movements in the terms of trade,
in addition to other supply and demand forces.
The model assumes that wages are set in a bargaining framework
in which insiders and outsiders interact, following Blanchard and Sum-
mers (1986) and Blanchard (1991). This setting is used to introduce
rigidity in the labor market, which prevents nominal wages from ad-
justing rapidly to equilibrium and leads to partial hysteresis of the
unemployment rate. Over the very long run, however, unemployment
should be zero (after normalizing for the country-specific natural un-
employment rate), which is compatible with a vertical aggregate sup-
ply and no trend in the natural unemployment rate (Blanchard and
Katz, 1997). All shocks could have an impact on unemployment in the
short run, though.
The labor market indicator should depend exclusively on labor
market rigidity, since it needs to be comparable across countries.
However, some of the rigidity indexes found in the related literature
also depend on the elasticity of labor supply to real wages. An open
economy version of those indexes would further depend on the share
of tradable goods consumed in the economy. Our labor market flex-
ibility index depends exclusively on the coefficient of the model asso-
ciated with labor market rigidity in the wage equation.
The empirical strategy allows us to compute the direct measure
of persistence with which to assess the actual performance of labor
markets, by simulating responses to properly identified, isolated
shocks. We use a structural vector autoregression (SVAR), with the
long-run restriction identification strategy developed by Blanchard
and Quah (1989). We use the SVAR to study the dynamics of the real
wage, the real exchange rate, output, and unemployment in a sample
of both OECD countries and emerging markets. The model helps us
to impose the long-run restrictions and interpret the shocks. With
the purpose of analyzing unemployment persistence, we focus on the
impulse response functions of unemployment after the economy is
hit by the structural shocks.
3. Other examples include Fabiani and Rodriguez-Palenzuela (2001) and Viñals
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Our main conclusion is that Chile’s labor market reactions to
structural shocks are among the most flexible economies, ranking
third after Korea and Hong Kong and followed by the United States
and Mexico. At the other end of the ranking, Germany, Sweden, Spain,
and Colombia have the most rigid labor markets.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The first section
presents the model. The second describes the empirical strategy and
main results. The third section assesses the labor market index, and
the final section of the paper concludes.
1. THE MODEL
This section reproduces the basic insights of the model developed
in Albagli, García, and Restrepo (2004), starting with aggregate sup-
ply and demand. The economy is characterized by the supply of a
domestic tradable good by firms, which hire labor as the only factor
of production. The technology is assumed to be characterized by con-
stant returns. Aggregate supply is given by
where x is the productivity of labor and n is aggregate employment
(all variables are in natural logs throughout the description of the
model). Consumption is divided into the domestic good and an im-
ported good. To obtain aggregate demand, we use IS-LM analysis for
an open economy. The saving-investment equilibrium is given by
where              is the expected real interest rate, q is the real exchange
rate, z is the relative price of domestic to foreign goods (the terms
of trade), x is labor productivity, and τ  is a labor-force shock,4while
   are parameters.
4. These different shocks are included separately because they can conceiv-
ably affect aggregate demand through different channels. For example, productiv-
ity and the terms of trade affect permanent income, while the real exchange rate
affects aggregate demand through expenditure-switching effects and balance-
sheet effects. Although in the long run the real exchange rate is determined by
productivity and the terms of trade, in the short run it behaves according to the
nominal price rigidities embedded in the present framework, and should therefore
be considered separately. The labor supply shock is included as a scaling factor.
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Money market equilibrium is described by
where m is money suply, p is the price level and b is the semielasticity
of real money demand with respect to i, the nominal interest rate.
Given perfect capital mobility, nominal interest rates depend on the
parity condition, which—together with the Fischer equation—leads
to aggregate demand:
Domestic producer prices depend on nominal wages and produc-
tivity, through
The aggregate price level is then given by a weighted average of
domestic and foreign prices:
where s is the nominal exchange rate and γ  is the imported fraction
of aggregate consumption. The real exchange rate, which is given by
 can be combined with (5) in (6) to obtain consumers’ real
wages:
We follow the precedent of papers such as Blanchard and Sum-
mers (1986) in establishing nominal wage bargaining as a function of
union power. In our particular framework, unions negotiate nominal
wages at the beginning of the period (before shocks arrive) to keep
real wages equal to the previous period’s level, as opposed to the real
market-clearing or long-run wage (w – p)*. This is represented by
the following wage setting condition:
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where E is the expectations operator and λ  represents unions’ bar-
gaining power.5
Labor supply is modeled as a function of real wages and a labor-
force shock,
where c is the elasticity of labor supply to real wages. Unemployment
is then given by
This basic framework thus defines a long-run equilibrium level of
real and nominal variables that depends on four exogenous shocks:
namely, shocks to productivity, the terms of trade, the labor supply,
and the quantity of money. Each variable is assumed to follow a ran-
dom walk process:
where                           are all uncorrelated independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) shocks.
The economy starts from a position of equilibrium and is then
subject to one or more exogenous shocks. The purpose of the model
is to highlight how labor market rigidities affect the system’s conver-
gence to a new steady state. Once the economy is hit by any of the
exogenous shocks, price rigidities stemming from wage bargaining
will cause temporary misalignment of the real exchange rate, which
directly affects aggregate demand and unemployment.
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5. This wage setting framework implies that after a shock, prices are affected
by the contemporaneous movement of the nominal exchange rate but not by
movements of the nominal wage, which is fixed for the current period.
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1.1 Dynamics
In the long run, real variables such as real wages, output, the
real exchange rate and employment depend on real determinants
only—namely, productivity, terms-of-trade and labor-supply shocks—
through the values of x, z, and τ . From equation (7), the long-run
workers’ (consumers’) real wage is
where an asterisk represents a long-run value. Equating supply and
demand renders
Using equations (12) and (13) in equation (9) and setting l = n in the
long run, we get the steady-state value of output:
Nominal variables, therefore, adjust to equations (12), (13), and (14),
given the monetary stance, such that the price level in the long run
is given by
Nominal wages and the nominal exchange rate are finally ob-
tained by adding equation (15) to the respective real values.
The specification of the shocks allows us to derive long-run identi-
fying restrictions, by reducing the model to a system of four equations.
These are equations (5), (13), (14), and (10), which relate real producer
wages (labor cost), the real exchange rate, output, and unemployment,
respectively, to the four exogenous shocks given by equation (11). In
the long run, labor costs depend on productivity shocks only; the real
exchange rate is affected by both productivity and terms-of-trade shocks;
output reflects productivity, terms-of-trade, and labor-supply shocks;
and unemployment responds only temporarily to all shocks, being zero
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in steady state. The nominal rigidity introduced by wage bargaining,
therefore, has no role in the long-run equilibrium.
Turning now to the short run, we analyze the dynamics that are
triggered when the system is hit by any of the four shocks, calling for
an adjustment in nominal variables in order to reach the new steady
state. Although the rigidity introduced by wage bargaining produces
symmetric responses of output and employment below and above their
long-run levels, we focus only on situations that cause temporal un-
employment—that is, shocks that call for a downward nominal wage
adjustment. For simplicity, we normalize each variable to zero in the
initial state. The timing of the model is the following. First, unions
and firms negotiate contracts (nominal wages) at the beginning of the
period. Second, the economy is hit by a structural shock, which re-
quires a downward adjustment of the nominal wage to reach the new
long-run equilibrium. Since wages are fixed for the present period,
prices adjust only partially (through the response of the nominal ex-
change rate), holding back aggregate demand and causing positive
unemployment. Finally, wages are partially adjusted at the begin-
ning of the next period, reflecting the previous real wage level and
the new lower steady-state value.
Given the stickiness originating from the wage-bargaining process,
prices follow a gradual adjustment path to their full-employment level.
The asset channel reacts without this delay, however, so the real ex-
change rate departs from its long-run level. Thus, output and employ-
ment are determined by demand in the short run. If, as the result of a
shock, the real exchange rate is below its long-run level, aggregate
demand and employment will also be below their long-run levels. In
contrast, the labor supply will temporarily rise with respect to its new
equilibrium level given the higher real wages (which depend nega-
tively on q); this results in a sharp increase in unemployment.
Panel A in figure 1 presents the comparative statics analysis in
the face of a monetary contraction. When mt falls, aggregate demand
moves as a result of two driving forces: the direct impact of the money
supply, which lowers demand, and the fall in prices caused by the
instantaneous nominal appreciation, which compensates the first ef-
fect. The compensation is only partial, however, because nominal
wages are fixed at the time of the shock; this ensures a negative
dominant effect on labor demand for a given real wage. At the same
time, the real wage increases as prices fall, which causes an increase
in the labor supply. The result is an expansion of unemployment.
This unemployment is gradually reduced as market pressure pushes310 Elías Albagli, Pablo García, and Jorge E. Restrepo
down real wages during subsequent nominal wage negotiations. Based
on equations (4), (8), (9), and (10), we derive that
which means that the persistence of unemployment is actually given
by the unions’ bargaining power, λ . The dynamics of the monetary
contraction are simulated in panel B of figure 1, using the Anderson-
Moore algorithm for solving dynamic systems. Structural parameters
were approximated with Chilean data, varying only the hypothetical
level of rigidity.
1.2 Building an Index of Labor Market Rigidity
To create a measure that captures the cyclical persistence of the
labor market, we need to build an index that satisfies two necessary
conditions. First, it must be related to λ . Second, it must be related
only to λ . This stems from the fact that two economies with the same
degree of labor rigidity may respond differently in output, wages, and
unemployment for a given shock. Such differences arise from the
other structural parameters introduced in the model, such as c (the
response of the labor supply to the real wage) and γ  (the relative
importance of the tradable sector).
A standard measure of wage rigidity is the index developed in
Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991) and Balmaseda, Dolado, and
López-Salido (2000), which computes the ratio of the accumulated re-
sponse of unemployment to the change in the real wage after the
shock. This type of measure is not appropriate in our current frame-
work, however, because it depends on c and γ  as well.
While the assumption of a constant value of c over a rather ho-
mogeneous sample of OECD countries seems acceptable, it is not
satisfactory when the sample is extended to include less-developed
countries, as we do. Assuming similar degrees of openness further
deteriorates the power of the measure. We therefore use an alterna-
tive measure that depends only on λ : namely, the half-life of unem-
ployment after a shock, or the number of periods required for
unemployment to decrease to one-half of its maximum value. From
equation (16), unemployment becomes one-half of its initial level at
period s*, where
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Figure 1. A Monetary Contraction
which depends positively and solely on the value of our measure of
labor market rigidity.
Source: Authors’ calculations.312 Elías Albagli, Pablo García, and Jorge E. Restrepo
2. THE EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
Since our purpose is to measure unemployment persistence in
the presence of shocks, we use the SVAR methodology. In particular,
we follow Balmaseda, Dolado, and López-Salido (2000) in identifying
the VAR with long-run restrictions, as in Blanchard and Quah (1989)
and Clarida and Galí (1994). These authors assume that some shocks
have permanent effects on some variables and transitory effects on
others and that some shocks may not have any permanent effect on
any variable. This procedure fits the intuition of a growing economy
in which unemployment goes back to its natural rate, although wages
and employment may change because of structural factors, and the
supply curve is vertical in the long run.
2.1 Structural Identification
The structural VAR identification, derived directly from the model,
provides a clear interpretation of the structural shocks. For clarity,
we rewrite several equations taken from the long-run equilibrium of
the model:
Only productivity shocks affect the real producer wage in the long run.
In the long run, the real exchange rate depends only on productivity
and the terms of trade.
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Output is affected in the long run by productivity, the terms of trade,
and the evolution of the labor force.
Finally, although all shocks affect unemployment in the short
run, the impact is not permanent since unemployment is stationary
in a partial hysteresis setting.
The identification is based on the assumption that the matrix of
structural long-run multipliers, C(1), is lower triangular. To find C(1),
it is necessary to first build the matrix f(1)Σ Σ Σ Σ Σ f(1)’ from the reduced
form estimation, where f(1) is the sum of the coefficients, and Σ Σ Σ Σ Σ  is the
variance-covariance matrix obtained. It is possible to show that C(1)
is the Choleski factor of f(1)Σ Σ Σ Σ Σ f(1)’. Once C(1) is found, it is easy to
compute all the structural coefficients, C, which are used to build the
impulse-responses, because C0 = f(1)–1C(1), and with C0 all Cs can be
computed given C(L) = f(L)C0.6
2.2 Data
We use quarterly data from 1980:1 to 2002:4 for real producer
wages (computed with the GDP deflator), the real exchange rate,
output, and unemployment. Most countries’ data sets come from the
OECD database. For non-OECD countries, data were found in the
respective central bank’s web site and, in some cases, in the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics data set.
Table 1 reports the source of the time series for each country.
The model assumes that real wages, real exchange rates, and
output are integrated processes, while unemployment is stationary.7
We ran Dickey-Fuller tests for all variables, but in several countries
the null hypothesis of a unit root for the unemployment rate could
not be rejected (see table 2). However, we follow Balmaseda, Dolado,
and López-Salido (2000) in assuming a partial hysteresis setup,
because it seems unreasonable to consider the consequences of any
6. For a detailed explanation, see Clarida and Galí (1994) and Enders (1995).
7. The Dickey-Fuller test rejected the unit root hypothesis for the real ex-
change rate of Denmark and the Netherlands. We therefore ran the stationary
VAR [∆ (w – pp), q, ∆ y, u] for these two countries.
(21) *0 . = uReal exchange
























































a. HKMA: Hong Kong Monetary Authority. IMF: from International Financial Statistics. OECD: from Main Economic Indicators and Quarterly Labour Force Statistics































































































Table 2. Dickey–Fuller Unit Root Testsa
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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shock on unemployment as permanent, even in the most rigid econo-
mies.8 We therefore estimated the following stationary VAR, impos-
ing the long-run restrictions above described: [∆(w – pp), ∆q, ∆y, u]’.
For the purpose of comparison, we also run a three-variable (closed
economy) VAR equivalent to the one found in Balmaseda, Dolado,
and López-Salido (2000): [∆(w – pp), ∆y, u]’. Most VARs were estimated
using two lags based on the LM multivariate residual test for
autocorrelation and the other regular criteria.9
2.3 Estimation Results
Given the large number of economies in our sample, we decided
to report the impulse responses of a small subgroup of countries with
varying degrees of labor market flexibility (see figure 2). The confi-
dence intervals were obtained with a bootstrap procedure using 500
replications.10 In general, a positive productivity shock causes real
wages to increase in both the short and long terms. When a terms-of-
trade shock hits the economy, real (producer) wages increase only in
the short run.11 In the case of positive labor-force shocks, the re-
sponse of real wages tends to be negative in the short run, but it is
insignificant in several cases. Real wages also fall in response to a
monetary shock (expansion), most notably in the cases of Chile, Co-
lombia, and the United States. In Korea and Sweden wages are
procyclical, and they do not move in the United Kingdom.
The real exchange rate tends to appreciate when a positive pro-
ductivity shock strikes the economy. After a positive terms-of-trade
shock, the real exchange rate appreciates in both the short and long
8. We also performed cointegration tests for all countries (as in Balmaseda,
Dolado, and López-Salido, 2000); the null hyphotesis of no cointegration among
the integrated variables [w - p, q, y] was not rejected. With respect to the empiri-
cal rejection of the absence of integration in unemployment series, we agree with
several authors mentioned in the paper who treat unemployment as an I(0) pro-
cess, regardless of its severe persistence in the short run. From a theoretical
perspective, which we consider the most relevant, the unemployment rate can
hardly be considered a variable with a forecast of infinite variance.
9. We refer to the Akaike, Schwartz, and Hannan-Quinn information crite-
ria. Kilian and Ivanov (2000) analyze which criterion performs better for VARs
with different sample sizes.
10. See Benkwitz, Lütkepohl, and Wolters (2001) for an analysis of alterna-
tive bootstrap procedures.
11. In Chile and Colombia, real wages go the wrong way, falling in the short
run after a positive terms-of-trade shock.Figure 2. Impulse-Response Functions to Structural Shocks, Selected Countries
Source: Authors’ calculations.Figure 2. (continued)
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terms. The response of the real exchange rate after a labor-force shock
is seldom significant. The real exchange rate tends to increase in the
short run as a result of a monetary expansion shock. Finally, the re-
sponse of unemployment after a positive productivity shock is not clear-
cut: it increases in many countries, but it does the opposite in several
others. Unemployment tends to increase after a labor-supply shock
and to decrease with either a terms-of-trade shock or a positive mon-
etary disturbance, but there are exceptions to these trends.
Labor Market Rigidity Index
Table 3 shows the rankings we built by computing the average
half-life of the unemployment responses for all shocks. The table re-
ports rankings estimated for both closed- and open-economy specifi-
cations (based on three and four variables, respectively). Korea and
Hong Kong are the most flexible countries, followed by Chile, Mexico,
and the United States. This is consistent with recent evidence for the
Korean economy, where unemployment peaked after the Asian crisis
but quickly returned to its previous level. On the other hand, Chile is
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still relatively flexible in an international context despite the two
labor reforms that may have introduced some rigidity into the labor
market after 1990.
At the other end of the spectrum, Germany, Sweden, Spain, and
Colombia are ranked as the most rigid labor markets. In Colombia,
unemployment increased sharply during the 1999 crisis, reaching 20
percent, but it decreased very slowly in 2003. In the middle range of
rigidity are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, and the Nether-
lands among others. The ranking has a positive and significant corre-
lation with average unemployment, as can be expected.
3. ASSESSMENT OF THE CHILEAN LABOR MARKET RIGIDITY
RANKING
Can we infer from the rankings presented in table 3 that Chile is a
flexible economy in comparison with most of the countries considered?
The evidence presented suggests precisely that. Nevertheless, we must
mention a number of caveats before precipitating conclusions.
First, the ranking is based on unemployment persistence. Unem-
ployment, however, is a net measure between labor supply and em-
ployment, so the rigidity implied by its persistence hides the true
origin of market frictions. A rigid labor market can be dominated by
an inefficient process of job reallocation, in which case the persis-
tence is best attributed to rigid employment creation. Alternatively,
the source of rigidity could be labor market institutions (that is, so-
cial security benefits) that foster persistent job search even when
hiring prospects are low. In this context, the different correlations
between unemployment and labor market participation across coun-
tries could help to disentangle the dominant source of rigidity. The
fall in labor participation during high unemployment periods would
suggest that at least part of this supposed flexibility comes from people
exiting unemployment toward inactivity, not employment.
Second, as mentioned in the introduction, a growing part of em-
ployment creation is in the form of low-skilled, informal positions of
self-employment. Any assessment of flexibility must therefore take
into account the extent to which the adjustment actually occurs out-
side the more formal market. Unfortunately, lack of comparable data
on informality among countries over long periods impedes further
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Finally, although the 1990s as a whole were characterized by in-
creasing labor market regulation, reform critics point out that the
structural change in adjustment capacity was only triggered by the
recent regulations of 1999–2001. Whether this view is sustainable
cannot be determined by the methodology presented. The empirical
approach adopted here is limited to the small number of data points
after the reform. When we ran the same VAR for Chile from 1986 to
1998 and from 1990 to 2002, we found no significant difference rela-
tive to the responses of unemployment using the whole sample.
Given these caveats, our performance-based ranking suggests that,
when examined using a methodology that properly distinguishes shock
responses from the persistent behavior of unemployment, the Chil-
ean labor market appears to be relatively flexible.
4. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we ranked labor market rigidity for a sample of
eighteen countries, with the purpose of characterizing the relative
rigidity of the labor market in Chile. We analyzed the dynamic re-
sponses of unemployment in the presence of macroeconomic shocks
identified with a structural VAR following Blanchard and Quah (1989).
The setting of the empirical approach and the interpretation of the
shocks are based on a model with rigidity in the labor market through
the insider-outsider bargaining setup, which was popularized by
Blanchard and Summers (1986) and is extended for an open economy
in Albagli, García, and Restrepo (2004).
The restrictions derived from the model imply that in the long
run, real producer wages grow only with productivity; the real ex-
change rate depends only on productivity and the terms of trade;
output is affected by productivity, terms-of-trade, and labor-force
shocks; and unemployment converges to its natural rate despite short-
run disturbances. The model allows us to build an indicator of rigid-
ity based on unemployment persistence and depending only on the
rigidity coefficient of the wage-setting equation: namely, the half-life
of unemployment after the shocks. We used this indicator to build
rankings that served as the basis of comparison within our sample.
We found that Korea and Hong Kong have the most flexible labor
markets, followed by Chile, Mexico and the United States. At the
other end of the ranking, Germany, Sweden, Spain, and Colombia
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These findings support the view that despite the strict labor regu-
lation introduced in the 1990s, labor market outcomes in Chile are
still far from the European experience of high, persistent unemploy-
ment. Whether this results from weak institutional enforcement and
whether the more recent reforms account for a structural change in
labor market dynamics are interesting challenges for future research.Assessing the Flexibility of the Labor Market in Chile 327
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